The roots of romantic cognitivism:(post) Kantian intellectual intuition and the unity of creation and discovery by Macleod, Christopher
e Roots of Romantic Cognitivism: (Post) Kantian Intellectual
Intuition and the Unity of Creation and Discovery
Christopher Macleod, Lancaster University
e ﬁnal version of this paper appears in the European Romantic Review (2014) 25(4): 403–422.
Abstract
During the romantic period, various authors expressed the belief that through creativ-
ity, we can directly access truth. To modern ears, this claim sounds strange. In this paper, I
attempt to render the position comprehensible, and to show how it came to seem plausible
to the romantics. I begin by oﬀering examples of this position as found in the work of the
British romantics. Each thinks that the deepest knowledge can only be gained by an act of
creativity. I suggest the belief should be seen in the context of the post-Kantian embrace of
‘intellectual intuition’. Unresolved tensions in Kant’s philosophy had encouraged a belief
that creation and discovery were not distinct categories. e post-Kantians held that in
certain cases of knowledge (for Fichte, knowledge of self and world; for Schelling, knowl-
edge of the Absolute) the distinction between discovering a truth and creating that truth
dissolves. In this context, the cognitive role assigned to acts of creativity is not without its
own appeal.
During the romantic period, various authors expressed the belief that through creativity, we
can directly access truth. is was not merely the claim that creative hypothesising is a necessary
precursor to conﬁrmation, or that the writer can create a world-in-ﬁction to which he comes
to have exclusive epistemic access. Nor was it merely the claim that the human faculties are
actively involved in moulding experience. is, to the romantic generation, was old news. e
claim is a far stronger one: that via a productive and creative act, we can come to have direct
access to truth that cannot be otherwise known. Call this position romantic cognitivism.1 e
idea of knowing directly through an act of creativity has become foreign to us, and is a strange
one. It is the purpose of this paper to try and cast light upon the roots of the theory.
It is worth emphasising at this stage that I do not attempt in this paper to convince the reader
that romantic cognitivism is true. Neither do I give an historically detailed account of the origins
and transmission of the position.2 Rather, I aim to render the position comprehensible and to
present an account that will allow the reader to become sympathetic to the romantics’ stance.
Because it is short, the account given here will pass all too quickly over certain philosophic
details, but will, I hope, convince the reader that romantic cognitivism is worth taking seriously.
e claim that creativity can lead to truth is not a clumsy power-grab, made by poets seeking
to privilege or legitimise their trade. It is a position with clear philosophic motivations.
I begin by highlighting that the thought that truth can be reached by creativity can be
found in Coleridge, providing a short account of the position as it appears in his work. I go
on to show that in endorsing romantic cognitivism, Coleridge is in good romantic company.
A commitment to the position is also visible in the works of other contributors to what used
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to be termed the ‘romantic canon’: Wordsworth, Blake, Keats, and Shelley. is will come as
no surprise to readers, the story having been well told previously by M.H. Abrams, amongst
others. In what follows, however, I detail a part of the story that has not been so well told: how
such a position could have come to seem plausible in the wake of problems internal to Kant’s
philosophy. All are aware that Kant’s philosophic revolution provided the intellectual backdrop
that facilitated an equally important revolution within literature; fewer, I think, will be clear on
the nuts and bolts of this facilitation.
I consider how troubles within Kantian philosophy generated post-Kantian solutions that
embraced romantic cognitivism. Kant had left unsolved the problem of how the human faculties
could shape and render intelligible experience that was utterly foreign to the human mind, and
how a uniﬁed self prior to that experience could be accounted for. He had developed the tools
necessary for a resolution of these diﬃculties, however, in the form of a hypothetical faculty of
intellectual intuition. e post-Kantian developed this notion of intellectual intuition, which
merged the categories of creation and discovery. Creativity was given a central cognitive role, as
a foundation for philosophy and a necessary precondition for the possibility of experience.3
I Romantic Cognitivism in British Romanticism
Part of the romantic agenda broadly was to unify the notions of creation and discovery; this
innovation grounds the account given by M.H. Abrams of the changing view of imagination
in both e Mirror and the Lamp and Natural Supernaturalism. Abrams is not alone in high-
lighting the cognitive role that imagination plays for the romantics. Cecil Bowra’se Romantic
Imagination is devoted to the thesis that the romantics “believed that the imagination stands in
some essential relation to truth and reality” (5) and their claim “that poetry deals in some sense
with truth” (7). is aspect of romanticism has recently been revisited by Charles Larmore, who
writes that “the presumed antagonism between imagination and reality” formed the “struggle in
which the Romantic project essentially consisted” (21). eir theory of the imagination, which
he terms “Creative-Responsive”, “is one that undoes the supposed dichotomies—between cre-
ative and responsive, expressive and mimetic, imagination and reality” that structure our own
understanding of art’s relation to the world (7–9).
e romantic attempt to sublate creation and discovery, as we shall see, takes the speciﬁc
form of suggesting that through acts of creativity, we can directly uncover and reveal truths. Of
course, not all romantic authors subscribe to the romantic cognitivist claim that the imagination
can access truth in equal measure. A belief in the cognitive role of the imagination is not
a stable article of faith, interpreted in the same manner by every thinker that endorses it; it
is, rather, an open ended trope, with which the romantics often struggled, and to which they
constantly returned. Neither was it a position explored purely philosophically. When articulated
by the poets of British romanticism—it is these thinkers we shall consider ﬁrst—it is not spoken
in a philosophical voice. Even Coleridge’s works, which come closest to engaging in purely
philosophical enquiry, do not sustain the analytic rigour appropriate for philosophical texts. For
the British romantic poets, the claim functions rhetorically, signalling a commitment to a belief
in the power of the imagination, and it must be treated as such. Nevertheless, a commitment
to the core thought that creativity has a cognitive role remains. And that the position is central
enough to be contested and rearticulated in various authors makes it all the more clear how
deeply the underlying claim inﬂuenced the romantics. It is this that must be explained.
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e epistemology Coleridge embraced—reaching beyond art in the narrow sense in to all
areas of human enquiry—involves a merging of the categories of creation and discovery. Co-
leridge distinguishes the Reason and the Understanding.4 e Understanding is the procedural
or discursive rational faculty: it reasons inductively and deductively, by means of reﬂection, gen-
eralisation, and abstraction. Reason is the faculty of Ideas, which are super-empirical, almost
Platonic, objects of thought.
I should have no objection to deﬁne Reason … as an organ bearing the same
relation to spiritual objects, the Universal, the Eternal, and the Necessary, as the
eye bears to material and contingent phaenomena. (Coleridge e Friend 4[1]:
155–6)
Unlike the Understanding, the Reason is generative. It is an “irradiative Power”, which
creates, synthesises, and produces (Opus Maximum 15: 87). “Reason in all its decisions appeals
to itself, as the ground and substance of their truth” (e Friend 4[1]: 155–6). Reason is pro-
ductive, provides its own materials, and in this sense Coleridge indicates that it is a genuinely
creative faculty—a faculty involved in originating ideas rather than reﬂecting externalities—that
reaches truth by its autonomous activity. e poles of creation and discovery are thereby moved
closer together. Indeed, as Mary Perkins points out, “Reason includes the faculty of Imagina-
tion” (404). Coleridge himself notes that it is “wonderful, how closely Reason and Imagination
are connected” (e Friend 4[1]: 203n).
Coleridge distinguishes two aspects of Imagination—the primary and secondary—but ﬁrst
of all separates the active operation of the Imagination entirely from the mechanical operation
of the Fancy. e Fancy, being merely “Memory emancipated”, operates by reordering past
perceptions, but is not productive, and does not relate to Truth (Biographia Literaria 7[1]: 305).
In contrast, the Imagination does not merely reorganise, but creates. e primary Imagination
is the central philosophic organ of all mental activity: “e primary  I hold to be
the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception” (Biographia Literaria 7[1]: 304). As
such, Coleridge extends creativity a role in all acts of belief-formation. is primordial act of
production, which is the enabling condition of all access to Truth, is, for Coleridge, present in all
acts of what we commonly call ‘artistic’ creativity, which are acts of the secondary Imagination.
In such acts, the Imagination is again active in simultaneously creating and discovering. “e
secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will,
yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and diﬀering only in degree, and
in the mode of its operation” (Biographia Literaria 7[1]: 304). All acts of Imagination have this
cognitive feature, forging a direct connection with Truth.
Imagination is, for Coleridge, an activity of self that is ultimately identical to selfhood : it is
“a repetition in the ﬁnite mind of the eternal act of creation in the inﬁnite  ” (Biographia
Literaria 7[1]: 304). e importance of this claim will become clear in the following sections,
when apperception will emerge as pivotal in the post-Kantian account of creative-discovery. For
now it will suﬃce to note that Coleridge holds that only the Imagination, in both its primary and
secondary form, is capable of direct cognitive contact with Truth, because nature is itself vital
and living: natura naturans, a constant act of becoming takes central place in the metaphysics.
“Remember that whatever is, lives” (Church and State 10: 183). Because the world is dynamic
and creative rather than mechanical, so the individual’s engagement with truth must be, too.
ough it is articulated in quite a diﬀerent way, Wordsworth shares the belief that, in the
creative or imaginative act, truth can be discovered. e Prelude is described by Wordsworth as
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a history “Of intellectual power, from stage to stage / Advancing, hand in hand with love and
joy, / And of imagination teaching truth” (207; bk. 11: 43–5). It is the imagination that
lifts
e Being into magnanimity;
Holds up before the mind, intoxicate
With present objects and the busy dance
Of things that pass away, a temperate shew
Of objects that endure[.] (Prelude 219; bk. 12: 31–3)
ForWordsworth, as for Coleridge, the creative faculty is endowed with an ability to uncover
truth. And, again, as such, this creative faculty is linked to the cognising faculty of Reason.
Wordsworth writes that imagination is
but another name for absolute strength
And clearest insight, amplitude of mind,
And Reason in her most exalted mood. (Prelude 233; bk. 14: 190–2)
Such a conception of Reason is distinguished from the mere discursive understanding, or
the “self-applauding intellect”, in Wordsworth’s terms (Prelude 233; bk. 14: 190). Without the
exercise of imagination, the use of the mere understanding leaves “Caverns … within my mind,
which sun / Could never penetrate” (Prelude 41; bk. 3: 245–6).5 Acts of genuine creativity
can fulﬁl an intellectual and not mere expressive role—and the disclosing role of imagination
renders poetry a vehicle for arriving at truth.
Poetry is the most philosophical of all writings… its object is truth, not individual
and local, but general, and operative; not standing upon external testimony, but
carried alive into the heart by passion. (Wordsworth Lyrical Ballads 301)
Wordsworth and Coleridge are the prime exemplars of the romantic impulse to unite cre-
ativity and discovery. Independently, however, Blake articulates a strikingly similar view on the
role of creativity in accessing truth. As one would expect, there are subtle diﬀerences to the de-
tails of Blake’s view. Both Coleridge and Wordsworth’s romantic cognitivism have theological
dimensions, being connected to pantheistic modes of viewing the relation of man, world and
God—yet their consideration of the intersection of creativity and discovery takes place on the
terrain of philosophical theology. Blake’s spiritual enthusiasm leads him to articulate the unity
of creation and discovery in richer language, less philosophical but more appropriate to the
development of a renewed Christian mythology. e conﬁdence Blake places in the creative
imagination as a route to truth often turns on imagination itself being a reﬂection of God.6
Blake holds that the imagination—“e Divine Vision”—has a direct cognitive function, and
assigns free creativity the role of revelation (On Wordsworth 665). “Vision or Imagination is a
Representation of what Eternally Exists, Really Unchangeably” (A Vision of the Last Judgment
554). “I am Inspired! I know it is Truth! For I sing / According to the inspiration of the Poetic
Genius” (Milton 108). Contrasted, the non-imaginative cognitive process is held to be mere
“Two Horn’d Reasoning, Cloven Fiction, / In Doubt, which is Self contradiction” (Gates of
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Paradise 268). For Blake, as, Northrop Frye notes, “a man’s imagination is his life. ‘Mental’
and ‘intellectual’ … are exact synonyms of ‘imaginative’ ” (19).
Keats, too, takes on the position, but is not in the end as wholehearted in his support as
Blake, Wordsworth or Coleridge.7 In letters, Keats claims to be “certain of nothing but of the
holiness of the Heart’s aﬀections and the truth of Imagination—What the imagination seizes as
Beautymust be truth” (365), and feels comfortable speaking of his progress as “a regular stepping
of the Imagination towards a Truth” (376). But if these seem to be unabashed declarations of
romantic cognitivism, he retains at other moments an underlying suspicion that this account
of the power of the imagination is too good to be true. e comparison of imagination “to
Adam’s dream,—he awoke and found it truth” (365) is double-edged and, on pain of making
the imaginative faculty seem magical, Keats implies that the imagination, like a dream, has a
perspective-altering function, allowing one to ﬁnd truth simply by colouring one’s interpretation
of the world. e equation of Truth and Beauty in Grecian Urn is not without irony, being
merely “all / Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know” (289), and Keats quickly shakes the
reader out of the imaginative ﬂight of Ode to a Nightingale with the reminder that such a ﬂight
is not reality: “the fancy cannot cheat so well / As she is fam’d to do, deceiving elf ” (288).8
Whether Keats in the end reaches any settled judgment on the romantic cognitivist claim,
a struggle with the relation of imagination and truth is pervasive in his work. So too, a version
of the thesis is appealing to Shelley, even if he sometimes falls back on the claim that creativity
merely expresses truth given by a natural world far more powerful than the human imagination.
When, for instance, Shelley oﬀers a Defence of Poetry, the battle is fought on many fronts, but
imagination’s role of discovering signiﬁcant truths is made central. Shelley prefers the vocabulary
of ‘poetry’, to that of ‘imagination’, but despite this variation, the theme is familiar. Poets are
referred to as prophets, who “apprehend the true and the beautiful” (112). Poetry “enlarges the
mind” (117). It is “the very image of life expressed in its eternal truth” (115). e “creative
faculty, which is the basis of all knowledge” is given responsibility for “the invention of the
grosser sciences, and that application of analytical reasoning to the aberrations of society” (134).
Poetry is “the centre and circumference of knowledge” (135).
Indeed, of those contributors to the traditional ‘British romantic canon’, it is only Byron
that does not oﬀer an extended theoretical treatment of the power of the imagination, and it is
only he that does not elevate the imagination to a cognitive role.9 Nor is romantic cognitivism
visible only in thinkers central to the canon, narrowly conceived. More examples could be given
of the inﬂuence of this general line of thought in thinkers normally considered to operate at the
fringes of romanticism.10
To isolate this commonality in various romantic thinkers is not, I repeat, to claim that
the philosophic position of each is identical, or that romantic cognitivism is held with equal
assurance by each author we might ﬁnd it useful to label ‘romantic’. Nor is it to essentialise one
aspect of romanticism: if anything has become clear about the period in recent years, it is surely
the many ways in which the romantics and their contemporaries were far frommonolithic, each
having problems, agendas, and ideals of their own. Romanticism is not a ‘natural kind term’,
and expecting deep commonalities between a disparate group of authors will not get us far.11
Yet I hope that enough has been said to justify the claim that a form of romantic cognitivism
was common currency during this period.
I wish now to consider how this position might have come to be seen as philosophically
tenable. As we shall see, the claim that we can make direct cognitive contact with truth by acts
of creativity can be seen as a solution to problems internal to Kant’s philosophy. We should,
5
of course, exercise moderation in claiming that one and the same idea is at work in the writings
of the British romantics and philosophers reacting to Kant. A criterion of identity for ideas
articulated by thinkers operating in diﬀerent contexts is diﬃcult to establish, even within tighter
time periods than the one under consideration, and the truths the German Idealists sought
to establish as amenable to creative-discovery were quite diﬀerent from those of the British
romantics—their thought being concerned with social, moral, and aesthetic questions, rather
than those concerning the foundations of knowledge. e historical task of tracing connections
and transformations of the idea must be left to another occasion. Given how foreign the central
claim of romantic cognitivism has become to us, it is the persistence and credibility of the idea
in the period that I here wish to investigate.
II Intellectual Intuition and Creativity in Kant
eopeningmove of the Transcendental Aesthetic of theCritique of Pure Reason is to distinguish
intuition and concept.
In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects,
that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a
means is directed as an end, is intuition. (CPR A19/B33) 12
Objects are “given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone aﬀords us intuitions; but they
are thought through the understanding, and from it arise concepts” (CPR A19/B33). Intuitions
are the vehicle through which objects are directly presented to us; concepts allow us to make
judgments about those objects.
Looked at from a suﬃcient level of generality, this is really all that can be said about the
distinction. At this stage, Kant has presented us with a purely formal characterisation of the
conditions for cognition in general. As cognition occurs for the human subject, Kant ﬂeshes the
account out substantially throughout the Doctrine of Elements. A useful summary is given in
the early stages of the Transcendental Logic.
Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the ﬁrst of which
is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second the
faculty for cognising an object by means of these representations (spontaneity of
concepts); through the former an object is given to us, through the latter it is
thought in relation to that representation (as a mere determination of the mind).
Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition, so
that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor
intuition without concepts can yield a cognition. (CPR A50/B74)
We might think of intuition as the raw sense data presented to consciousness. We are recep-
tive to such intuitions, passively related to them. Concepts, by contrast, are those structuring
and comparative features that we actively employ in thinking about that data. We apply con-
cepts spontaneously to intuitions to make them comprehensible. Both intuitions and concepts
are necessary for us in cognition of objects, and as Kant puts it, “[t]houghts without content
are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (CPR A51/B75).
It is important, however, to note that these are substantive commitments on how human
beings perceive objects. ere is no reason to think that this mode of apprehension is the only
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one that is logically possible: other beings might very well be constituted such as to perceive in
an entirely diﬀerent manner. us Kant writes:
It is also not necessary for us to limit the kind of intuition in space and time to
the sensibility of human beings; it may well be that all ﬁnite thinking beings must
necessarily agree with human beings in this regard (though we cannot decide this),
yet even given such universal validity this kind of intuition would not cease to be
sensibility, for the very reason that it is derived (intuitus derivatives), not original
(intuitius originarius), thus not intellectual intuition[.] (CPR B72)
ough we perceive according to sensible intuition, not all beings need do so, and Kant
terms one such alternative intuitive faculty ‘intellectual’.13
A being with intellectual intuition would perceive directly and non-derivatively: it would
be a being for which there would be no need for the bringing of intuitions under concepts (the
intuitions achieved would in this case be in the literal sense “immediately” represented (Kant
What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made 20: 267).) A being with this hypothesised manner
of perceiving “does not intuit objects according to conditions of sensibility, and does it by way
of the understanding” (Kant What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made 267). And in such a
case, the understanding would be “operat[ing] like the senses, having pure intuitions” (Kant
LM 29: 954). A being with intellectual intuition would be “free, in his knowledge, from all
sensibility, and at the same time from the need to know by concepts” (Kant What Real Progress
has Metaphysics Made 20: 267).
Under the possession of intellectual intuition, Kant notes, there exists no distinction be-
tween sensible intuition and concept. “[B]oth disappear” for an intuitive understanding (CPrR
5: 402). Indeed the distinction between intuition simpliciter and concept seems redundant,
given that the role of concept has in eﬀect been integrated into intellectual intuition (Gardner
69). Just as the barrier between intuition and concept has been dissolved, so too the divide
between passivity and activity is undermined. e understanding being now an autonomous
faculty of perception, intellectual intuition is “mere self-activity” (CPR B68). Providing both
the matter and form for perceptions, an agent with intellectual intuition is receptive to nothing
but its own “complete spontaneity of intuition” (CJ 5: 406).
e implications of this are important to our understanding of the development of roman-
tic cognitivism, because the distinctions that would be undermined for a being in possession
of intellectual intuition are those that ground the barrier between creation and discovery. e
primary distinction between creatively summoning an object to one’s mind and perceiving an
object in the world, of course, is that while the former is free, the latter is constrained by how
the world is. For the ordinary agent, that is to say, while we may be free to imagine as we like,
perception remains at least partially determined by external content, which is an independent
variable beyond one’s control. But for an agent who is entirely active in all cognition, there
would be no distinction between constrained discovery and free productivity. As Hanna ob-
serves, for such a being, “to think it, is to make it so; to conceptualise an object is thereby to
intuit that very object” (198).
As A.B. Dickerson writes, an agent in possession of intellectual intuition is “not receiving
data from an independent reality, but rather creating the data and thus creating that reality”
(161). An agent who was totally spontaneous in their intellectual life—to the extent that per-
ceiving an object is no more than providing one’s self with the data of perception by an act of
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thought—would no longer be at the behest of some world external to mind. Rather, ‘percep-
tion’ for such a being, would be a free act of creativity. One who posseses intellectual intuition,
as Freydberg notes, “creates its object in the very act of knowing it” (30).
For a being for whom thinking of an object and being presented with that object are one
and the same act, discovery and creation are ultimately identical. e mind’s act of entertaining
the thought of an object would be identical to its bringing the object into existence. And as
such cognition would be the only mechanism of thought for a being without the distinction
of intuition and concept, there could be no act of thought which did not furnish its own in-
tuition and thereby bring about its object. Such is the consequence of supposing an intellect
could perceive with pure spontaneity, and there is no question that Kant sees this consequence.
“[I]ntellecual intuition would grasp and present the object immediately, and all at once” (On a
Recently Prominent Tone 8: 390). “If our understanding were intuitive, it would have no objects
except what is actual” (CJ 5: 402). “[A]ll objects that I cognise would be (exist)” (CJ 5:403). “If
we had intellectual intuitions, then our understanding would have to be creative and produce
the things themselves” (LM 29: 881).
Kant, as was noted above, does not think that humans have intellectual intuition. “ere
can be such an understanding, but the human understanding is not it” (LM 29: 241). (We
might well pause to consider that his choice of word for the false doctrine that we do intuit
intellectually—one that the romantics would come back to again and again—was “mysticism”.)
A plausible candidate for possessing the faculty, he however speculates, is God.14 And indeed,
as a manner of articulating the sort of perception that Kant is attempting to elucidate, this
is a helpful model. In considering what a divine intellect might look like, we are forced to
consider whether the distinctions of creativity and discovery, spontaneity and receptivity, can
be sustained where concept and intuition are merged. If God apprehends the world directly,
there is no distinction between his thinking something and it being so. Höﬀe compares Psalm 33
v. 9—“for he spake, and it was”—“a divine reason could creatively ‘see’ anything into existence
through the agency of an intuitus origanarius or intellectual intuition” (88–89).15
III Post-KantianWorries: Interaction, Pure Concepts, and Ap-
perception
If the notion of intellectual intuition played a relatively minor role in Kant’s philosophy, it would
come to be a dominant theme amongst the post-Kantian Idealists. It is through this dominance
of the notion that the idea of creative-discovery became philosophically credible, and it is an
appreciation of the arguments that were advanced by the post-Kantians in favour of humans
possessing intellectual intuition that renders romantic cognitivism intelligible.
Of all Kant’s positions, the distinction that was drawn between concept and object was held
to be one of the most problematic. In Beiser’s words, Kant
insisted upon a dualism between understanding and sensibility, so that the tran-
scendental subject is the source of only the form but not the matter of experience.
It was then the task of Kant’s great successors … to remove these recidivistic in-
consistencies and to complete Kant’s revolution. (2)
e post-Kantians possess a drive to transcend dichotomies wherever present, and this divi-
sion in themind “seemed schizophrenic in that it split human life into two or three irreconcilable
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sections without indicating how these should be brought together” (Solomon 45). e dualism
was a philosophic invitation, and their appetite had been whet by Kant’s claim that “there are
two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown
root” (CPR A15/B29). Fichte and Schelling, as we shall see in the following sections, make it
their goal to overcome Kant’s dualism and give an account of the ‘common root’.
At least three substantive arguments against Kant’s claim that sensibility and understand-
ing—intuition and concept—are distinct emerge from the context of post-Kantian Idealism,
however, and it is worth considering these arguments ﬁrst. e ﬁrst such argument comes from
Maimon. Maimon suggests that Kant’s division of sensibility and understanding renders the act
of perception dependent on an impossible interaction of two entirely heterogeneous faculties.
Understanding has to act on intuition to order content, and Kant is yet to explain how this
could be possible.
[Q]uid juris? … How can something a priori apply with certainty to something a
posteriori? In this case the answer or deduction that [Kant] give[s] us is completely
satisfying … But if the scope of the question is enlarged, it demands: How can an
a priori concept apply to an intuition[,] even to an a priori intuition? (Maimaon
229)
Maimon thinks that the question is unanswerable, so long as sensibility and understand-
ing are cognitively distinct. e mind-body dichotomy had been the undoing of the Cartesian
approach, and now the concept-intuition dichotomy provided a new problem of interaction.
is worry was good ammunition for the post-Kantians, who sought to fuse the faculties. e
charge, however, was not conﬁned to the claim that Kant should have acknowledged the unity
of sensibility and understanding. e post-Kantians also claimed that Kant had already un-
knowingly committed to a mixing of the notion of concept and intuition and the uniﬁcation
of the faculties.
e goal of explaining how objects of perception are possible for us can only be realised, Kant
suggests, if there can be said to be pure concepts of the understanding, prior to all experience.
We operate with a range of empirical concepts, but these can neither account for the ability
to unite the sensory manifold into objects for the abstraction and formation of such concepts,
nor can they account for the determination of which empirical concepts can be well-formed.
In order to unify the sensory manifold (the content of experience), we must be constrained by
some fundamental laws of synthesis. For Kant, the question as Pippin puts it is, “what accounts
for the normative limitations on collecting together and uniting that constitutes representing?”
(Hegel’s Idealism 26)
e answer Kant provides is that it is the concepts of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and
Modality, which are given a priori by the understanding, that provide both de facto and nor-
mative rules for how we unite the manifold. Kant’s argument leading to this conclusion—the
deduction of the table of categories in the Transcendental Analytic—is taken to be one of the
most diﬃcult sections of the ﬁrst Critique. We need not examine the argument in detail in order
to see why the post-Kantians found the general strategy troubling, however. To the extent that
there was an attempt to limit given content by means that were both objective and subjective,
whether by mediating judgments or imagination, or “determining [of ] sensibility internally”
(CPR B153), there was an amalgamation of intuition and concept.
Now all experience does indeed contain, in addition to the intuition of the senses
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through which something is given, a concept of an object as being thereby given,
that is to say, as appearing. (CPR A93/B126)
But if conceptual form was something given or appearing in intuition, rather than applied
to intuition—and this seems to be Kant’s method of showing that the “subjective conditions of
thinking … have objective validity” (CPR A89/B122)—then there seemed to be a blending of
understanding and sensibility. Pippin, once again, describes their problem well:
He appears to be trying to argue that objects “in their very givenness” conform
to the categories. But if he is successful in doing this, then he has shown that
what counts as given in experience is also determined by conceptual conditions,
by the “spontaneity” of the subject. And this would render problematic the whole
distinction between spontaneity and receptivity… identity between Concept and
intuited Particular looms on the horizon. (Hegel’s Idealism 29–30)
e problems of the Transcendental Deduction, and its apparent mixing of concept and
intuition, were major themes in the work of Kant’s successors, including Fichte and Schelling.
Particularly central to their interest, however, was a speciﬁc claim made during the derivation
of the Categories about the nature of the ‘I’. Kant follows Hume in ﬁnding no presentation of
the self within experience (Hume 164–5). At an empirical level, there neither is, nor could be,
any perception of a metaphysical self.
e consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations of our state
in internal perceptions is merely empirical, or ever variable; it can provide no
standing or abiding self in this stream of inner appearances[.] (CPR A106)
ough the self, according to Kant, is not present in the manifold of intuition, an awareness
of these perceptions as uniﬁed must accompany representations in order for them to qualify as
perceptions at all.
[N]o cognitions can occur in us, no connection and unity among them, without
that unity of consciousness that precedes all data of the intuitions, and in rela-
tion to which all representation of objects is alone possible. is pure, original,
unchanging consciousness I will now name transcendental apperception. (CPR
A107)
Kant terms this transcendental apperception because the unchanging consciousness to which
he refers is a consciousness of the ‘I’. e purely formal unity that is to bind representations to-
gether, Kant claims, can be only the mere consciousness of representations as mine. As such,
“[i]t must be possible for ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations”. (CPR B131) If repre-
sentations are to belong together as representations to a self, they must be perceived as belonging.
Mere belonging, that is to say, is not enough: the “unity of consciousness would be impossible
if in the cognition of the manifold the mind could not become conscious of the identity of the
function by means of which this manifold is synthetically combined into one cognition.” (CPR
A108)
Kant argues that in order for there to be experience, as such, we must be able to conceive
of the experience as belonging to an experiencing self. e post-Kantians felt unsatisﬁed: Kant
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had shown that “the ‘I think’ must accompany all my representations”, that in some manner
experience is apperceptive, but not how such a condition could pertain (Pippin Hegel’s Idealism
43). e question of how the thinking I was present in all experience remained open.
Again, the dualisms between receptivity/spontaneity and sensibility/understanding seemed
to crumble under the transcendental microscope. We are not presented with the ‘I think’
through the sensibility, yet neither do we apperceive conceptually. Kant tells us that apper-
ception is an “act of [the subject’s] self-activity” (CPR B130), and it is an activity of the un-
derstanding, yet it is unclear how the self could be presented in this manner, rather than merely
arbitrarily ‘read into’ the manifold. Kant’s commitment to an act of apperception, which was
in this sense self-validating, relied on the self being somehow found and posited in the same act
of apperception, and this seemed to blur the distinction between spontaneity and receptivity.
What Kant in an earlier work called a “mysterious power” (False Subtlety of Four Syllogistic
Figures 2:60) had become in the ﬁrst Critique “the supreme principle in the whole sphere of
human cognition” (CPR B135). Yet it remained, in the view of the post-Kantians, mysterious.
ough it ﬁt the proﬁle of what might be considered an intellectual intuition—an apparently
contentful yet non-sensible perception delivered and created by the understanding—Kant de-
nied that this was what the act of apperception amounted to (CPR B159). Yet the claim that
apperception was merely “an analytical proposition” (CPR B135) did not seem convincing.
IV Fichte: Creative-Discovery of Self and World
Fichte’s claim that the self posits itself and world is, from the outside, obscure. Yet, it is in un-
derstanding his claim that we see how romantic cognitivism also might come to seem defensible.
Within the post-Kantian context which the work appears, there were two important strands:
the ﬁrst was the worry, already outlined, about the division of intuition and concept, sensibility
and understanding, and passivity and spontaneity. e second was the ongoing attempt to oﬀer
a foundationalist account of transcendental idealism along the model of K.L. Reinhold.
Reinhold’s worries, shared by many, about the foundations of Kant’s work—primarily the
lack of systematicity in establishing theoretical foundations as given in the deduction of the
categories—had led him to attempt, in the Elementarphilosophie, a statement of transcendental
idealism along foundationalist lines. e attempted mending of the Kantian system depended
on derivation from the base Reinhold termed a “proposition of conciousness” (Beiser 247). e
details of this derivation need not concern us here. G.L. Schulze, in response to Reinhold, pub-
lished the dialogue ‘Aenesideum’ attacking this restatement of the critical philosophy, claiming
that it resulted in the scepticism that Kantianism aimed to avoid. is debate had led to the en-
trenchment of the aim producing a foundationalist statement of transcendental idealism. Fichte
adopted this as his goal, which as Ludwig Siep observes, is an ambitious one.
Regarding this demand for certainty, Fichte’s standards are even higher thanKant’s,
as he couples the transcendental method with the demands of Rationalism since
Descartes and Spinoza, i.e., that all knowledgemust be founded in a single, supreme,
self-grounded and indubitably evident principle. (59)
Fichte takes Kant to have shown that the doctrine of apperception is the supreme principle
of epistemology (W 1.475).16 Kant had shown that consciousness was determined by the condi-
tion of self-consciousness, and in this sense “a system of philosophy”, Fichte claims, “would have
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to set out from the pure self ” (W 1.477). e Wissenschaftslehre does exactly that, starting the
project of justifying human knowledge with the claim that “[t]he self posits itself, and by virtue
of this mere self-assertion it exists; and conversely, the self exists and posits its own existence by
virtue of merely existing” (W 1.96). Fichte takes this starting point to be indubitable by a free
being. Insofar as we are unconditioned and autonomous, the self must give itself its own form.
“e self presents itself to itself, to that extent imposes on itself the form of a presentation, and
is now for the ﬁrst time a something” (W 1.97).
Self-postulation is prior to any possession of concepts or sensible intuitions, the existence
of a self-consciousness being itself a precondition for any sort of knowledge. e act “comprises
only the form of selfhood, the self-reverting act which also, in fact, itself becomes the content
thereof” (W 1.515). Because the self that is found in this postulation is both form and content,
it is described as both concept and intuition (W 1.516). We have seen that, for Kant, where
the distinction between concepts and sensible intuition ceases to apply, we are in possession
of intellectual intuition, and the distinction between perceiving something to be the case and
making it the case dissolves. Contrary to what Kant had maintained, Fichte holds exactly that
the “primordial” (W1.91) act of apperception is an act of intellectual intuition.17 “is intuiting
of himself that is required of the philosopher, in performing the act whereby the self arises for
him, I refer to as intellectual intuition” (W 1.463).
e positing of ourselves, that is to say, is merely having an intellectual intuition of our own
existence. Our existing is identical to our positing of our existence, and we discover ourselves
in the act of self-positing. e individual is a “self-constructing self ”: “freely, and by his own
choice, he brings it about in himself ” (W 1.459). “It is so, because I make it so” (W 1.460).
“To posit oneself and to be are, as applied to the self, perfectly identical” (W 1.99).
Fichte makes it clear, further, that self positing is an act. We should not be mistaken into
thinking that we bring ourselves into existence by self-positing: rather, self-positing constitutes
the existence and discovery of the self. e self should not be conceived of as a ‘res’: its existence
as act exhausts its being (Siep 59). It is the activity of self-positing, that is to say, and not its result,
that is identical with the self and apperceptive awareness of the self. “e intellect, for idealism,
is an act, and absolutely nothing more; we should not even call it an active something” (W
1.440). “e intellectual intuition alluded to in the Science of Knowledge refers, not to existence
at all, but rather to action” (W 1.472). We do not discover what is created, rather discovery
and creation are in this instance one and the same. As Pinkard puts it, we are “instituted, and
not, as it were discovered”, and this instituting is normative, and self-authorising (113–4). For
this reason, Fichte describes self postulation as a ‘deed-act’ (tathandlung), and emphasises the
importance of the distinction between this foundationalism and Reinhold’s, which was based
on a perceived fact (W 1.468).
Fichte has, by this point, accounted for the self and self-presentation. Given the founda-
tionalist aspirations of the Wissenschaftslehre, his next project is to account for the presentation
of the not-self from this self. And, Fichte claims, the not-self is to be explained by the same
activity that gives rise to the self. A “not-self is opposed absolutely to the self ” (W 1.104); “[t]he
self posits absolutely an object (a contrasted, counterposited not-self )” (W 1.258). e activ-
ity of the self is held to be responsible not only for the presentation of itself, but also for the
presentation of the world.
Insofar as it can be considered as related to us, then, the not-self exists as posited. No other
foundation can be given to it: “[t]he source of all reality is the self, for this is what is immediately
and absolutely posited” (W 1.134). is is a condition of our having knowledge about the not-
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self, and Fichte explains such interaction in terms of the “limit” that not-self applies to self.
“Both self and not-self are posited, in and through the self, as capable of mutually limiting
one another” (W 1.125). is is again pre-conceptual, and is how empirical perceptions and
experience of the world arise: “presentation consists in the fact that the self posits a subjective
and counterposits another thing thereto as an objective, and so on” (W 1.209). e ‘so on’ here
clearly has much to do: by the process of dialectical positing and counterpositing, Fichte means
to derive the categories of judgment and subjective content of experience. But Fichte’s result is
“therefore that all reality—for us being understood, as it cannot be otherwise understood in a
system of transcendental philosophy—is brought forth solely by the imagination” (W 1.227).
For Fichte, then, a creative act, positing, is the path to knowledge of both self and world.18
Possessing an ability for intellectual intuition—knowing unconditioned by the distinction of
concept and object—the division for human beings between truth-tracking and truth-making
is, Fichte suggests, more ﬂuid than we might be accustomed to think. As we shall now see,
Fichte was not the only thinker in this tradition to reach this conclusion.
V Schelling: Absolute and Art
Schelling’s early work follows Fichte in attempting to provide a systematic statement of tran-
scendental idealism, and in taking the activity of apperception to provide the foundation of
such a system. Self-consciousness, once again, is to be the “Supreme Principle of Knowledge”
(STI 15).19 And, as for Fichte, such self-consciousness must be seen as act, identical to the self,
in the form of an intellectual intuition that is at once a production and perception of the self.
In contrast to sensory intuition, which does not appear as a producing of its object
and where the intuiting itself is therefore distinct from the intuited, an intuition
[that is simultaneously a producing of its object] will be called intellectual intuition.
e self is such an intuition, since it is through the self ’s own knowledge of itself that
that very self (the object) ﬁrst comes into being. For since the self (as object) is
nothing else but the very knowledge of itself, it arises simply out of the fact that it
knows of itself; the self itself is thus a knowing that simultaneously produces itself
(as object). (STI 27)
e centrality of intellectual intuition is once again founded on its priority to the possible
acquisition of conceptual apparatus. In intellectual intuition, “subject and object are immedi-
ately one” (STI 24), and in this context the form and content of the judgment “reciprocally
condition” each other. (STI 21) Intellectual intuition is immediate—“absolutely unmediated”
(STI 55)—and “hence it can never fall into the domain of demonstrable concepts” (Schelling
‘Of the I’, qtd. in Pinkard 176). Consequently, concept and intuition “can and should never
be separated” (IPN 173), and in knowledge generated by intellectual intuition, “intuition and
concept, form and object, ideal and real, are originally one and the same.” (IPN 35)e collapse
of concept and object once again results in a seeping of creativity into discovery. As Pinkard
puts it,
spontaneity had to be somehow at one with receptivity in human knowledge; to
be led to the point where conceptual argument is of no more value, Schelling
concluded, is to be led ‘into a region where I do not ﬁnd ﬁrm ground, but must
produce it myself in order to stand ﬁrm upon it.’ (176–7)
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Intellectual Intuition, then, is again placed at the centre of philosophy: “Without intellec-
tual intuition no philosophy!” (Schelling Vorlesungen, qtd. in Beiser 580). And Intuition is
again “productive” in positing matter and nature (STI 72). We should not see nature as prod-
uct, however; this is to alienate a world that we must have access to. e separation of active
idea and passive object is “spiritual sickness”, a product of an incomplete philosophy of “mere
reﬂection” on objects (IPN 11). If we are to have successful cognitive contact with objects, “a
point must surely come where mind and matter are one” (IPN 40). Nature is seen, then, as a
productivity that can only be reﬂected on as product.
e distinctive contribution of Schelling’s early work for our purposes comes from this
fuller explication of the pre-conceptuality condition on intellectual intuition: the nature of
the product of the intellectual intuition, and the project of providing such an account. e
intellectually intuited, Schelling refers to as ‘the Absolute’. e Absolute is, as unmediated by
concepts, a totality: limitation comes about through acts of predication; to apply concepts, we
disjoin an object from what it is not, and thereby bound it. But the intellectually intuited is not
encountered in this manner: our access to it is immediate, and therefore it alone is pure unity.
e Absolute “cannot, in fact, have any predicates whatever; for it is the absolutely simple, and
thus can have no predicates drawn either from intelligence or free agency.” (STI 209) Indeed,
the intuited cannot even be rightly thought of even as object or subject, transcending even these
categories. e Absolute, rather, is merely self-reﬂective Being, and as such, Schelling prefers to
refer to the Absolute as ‘subject-object’.
e pre-conceptuality and subject-object identity of the Absolute is used by Schelling to
reclarify the notion of intellectual intuition that had been present in the work of Kant and Fichte.
Schelling deﬁnes intellectual as “the capacity to see the universal in the particular, the inﬁnite in
the ﬁnite, and indeed to unite both in a living unity” (Schelling Vorlesungen, qtd. in Beiser 580).
Concepts apply to an inﬁnite plurality, and object a concrete singularity: intellectual intuition is
not bound by this distinction, and sees these two in their primordial unity and co-dependence.
Outside the domain of concepts and objects, there is nothing that it means to be universal or
particular. As Beiser writes: “what I intuit is the identity of the universal and particular; I see
how the particular is inseparable from the whole of which it is a part, and how the whole cannot
be without that particular” (581). is merging of all into unity collapses the subject and object
distinction also: there is no categorical discontinuity between subject and object, both being a
manifestation of the Absolute.
is reclariﬁcation of intellectual intuition, however, leads to a notable diﬃculty, which we
might term the problem of articulation. Given that intellectual intuition of the Absolute is pre-
conceptual and immediate, how can we give any expression to it when our means are entirely
conditioned? As Bowie poses the diﬃculty: “how can one say anything about what must have
been before anything could be said?” (99) If the Absolute deﬁes characterisation by concepts,
then how can it be articulated and put to use at all?
Schelling addresses the problem of articulation—the problem of how to articulate the very
foundations of philosophy—head on. We cannot demonstrate or speak about the Absolute: as
Horstmann puts it, it cannot be given “as an object; it is the pre-objective identity of spirit with
itself ” (134). But we can nevertheless be made aware and manifest it via artwork. “Schelling
makes art into the organon and criterion of intellectual intuition … he maintains that aesthetic
experience is the medium and proof of our awareness of the absolute” (Beiser 584).
e whole of philosophy starts, and must start from a principle which, qua abso-
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lutely identical, is utterly non-objective. …at it can no more be apprehended
through concepts than it is capable of being set forth by means of them, stands in
no need of proof. …is universally acknowledged and altogether incontestable
objectivity of intellectual intuition is art itself. (IPN 289)
“[A]esthetic intuition is precisely intellectual intuition which has become objective” (IPN
229). In this sense, art is “the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy, which
always and continuously documents what philosophy cannot represent externally” (IPN 231).
Schelling nominates the aesthetic because the characteristics we have seen are merged in
the absolute—its status as subject-object and being universal-in-particular—make artwork the
appropriate vehicle for an indirect sort of representation of the Absolute. e artwork manifests
both the objective and the subjective; as Beiser puts it, “the subjective pole of the absolute
manifests itself in free and conscious activity, and … its objective pole appears as necessary
and subconscious activity” (Beiser 584). Art brings together “on the one side the product of
nature, and on the other upon the product of freedom … unit[ing] in itself the characteristics
of both” (IPN 219). “e work of art reﬂects to us the identity of the conscious and unconscious
activities” (IPN 225), and in so doing parallels the object-subject identity of the Absolute. e
artwork is, additionally, universality displayed in particularity. Artworks are necessarily open
to a multitude of interpretations, and thereby present the inﬁnite possibility in the ﬁnite. “So
it is with every true work of art, in that every one of them is capable of being expounded ad
inﬁnitum, as though it contained an inﬁnity of purposes” (IPN 230). us, generality of concept
and particularity of object are transcended in the artwork. In Bowie’s terms, “the meaning of
the work cannot be exhausted, even though it is manifested in an object” (52).
Art, then, is a manifestation of the Absolute—it expresses what cannot properly be articu-
lated. And, yet, it would clearly be a mistake to think that art allows us somehow to metaphor-
ically depict some separate ‘Absolute’ already encountered. “[T]he real world evolves entirely
from the same original opposition as must also give rise to the world of art” (IPN 231). “[W]hat
we speak of as the poetic gift is merely productive intuition, reiterated to its highest power. It is
one and the same capacity that is active in both … its name is imagination” (IPN 230). Rather,
art is our only access to the Absolute, from the inside, for productivity of self is what drives the
Absolute. Intellectual intuition, that act in which we creatively-discover the Absolute, is best
displayed by the medium of creativity, for it is creativity. Again, then, the emphasis is not on
the communication of truth already apprehended, but on the cognitive function that creativity
itself performs.
VI Conclusion
As stated above, it has not been my purpose in this paper to try and persuade the reader that
romantic cognitivism is correct. Nor has it been my purpose to track romantic cognitivism’s
migration from German philosophy to the British literature, though causal lines of inﬂuence
do certainly exist, and an historical story can be told about Coleridge’s reproduction and dis-
semination of the work of Kant, Fichte and Schelling.20 What has been shown is that, under
the inﬂuence of concerns about Kant’s philosophy, the post-Kantians close the gap between
creation and discovery. e notion of creative-discovery, then, was common currency within
philosophy, as well as literary circles, during the period within which romanticism ﬂourished.21
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is, I hope, goes some way towards showing how what might seem a strange position was in
fact an intelligible perspective to adopt.
Of course, it is not obvious that creativity was accessing the ‘right sort’ of truths in the
hands of the romantics. Schelling had defended the claim that creativity could grant epistemic
access to the Absolute; Fichte had suggested that we come to know of the self and world by
an act of creative-discovery. e post-Kantians, then, focused on the possibility of acquiring
foundational philosophic knowledge via the creative or aesthetic act. ese were not the sorts
of truths that Coleridge, Wordsworth, and the other British romantics, had in mind for creative-
discovery. Rather, they set their sights on far broader truths: truths about the meaningful goals
of life and art, about the emotions, and about social arrangements.
is was no arbitrary choice. e post-Kantians had put creativity to work in ﬁnding philo-
sophic foundations as a solution to the problem of philosophic scepticism. Philosophic scepti-
cism was not the primary concern of the romantics, however, and in appealing to imagination,
they sought to protect not philosophy, but rather values and ideals from being undermined by the
discursive reason (‘Understanding’, in Coleridge’s terminology.) e British romantics sought
to answer the concern that on its own, this mode of reason could not act as a foundation for our
ethical lives (where ‘ethical’ is taken to be broader than ‘moral’, pertaining also to our aesthetic,
religious, and social practices). is was a worry generated by a view of the discursive reason as
essentially negative—as without limit in its ability to dissect arguments, identify fallacies, and
analyse claims, but unable by itself to put anything in place of the value-sustaining beliefs it
undermined.22 e imagination was to play this central generative role, establishing truths that
were beyond the range of free critique.
is is of course not to say that the values and ideals that the authors sought to place on the
foundation of the imagination were uniﬁed. Coleridge in the Biographia Literaria set out the
epistemological grounds that would be used in Church and State to shore up social truths against
the encroachment of instrumental reason, and to ensure continuity and reform of speciﬁc insti-
tutions. A similar romantic cognitivist technique is put to quite diﬀerent use by Wordsworth
in the Prelude, where the aim is the consolidation of truths of a more personal kind. e goal
here is to document the growth of the mind of the poet and the overcoming of disenchantment:
a growth of imagination accompanied by a renovation of ideals. Blake utilises the imagination
in order to establish truth that is ultimately religious and mythological—guarding against an
undermining critique of Christianity and reconstructing a more motivationally eﬀective faith.
In this sense, the British romantics were far more ambitious about the cognitive results
of creativity than the post-Kantians. While it may well be that these broader ethical claims
can be justiﬁed by an appeal to intellectual intuition, it is not obvious that the romantics ever
seriously attempted this derivation. If, as Schelling thought, an act of creativity grants access
to the Absolute, which can be taken to transcend the distinction between particular truths and
to encompass all truth, the development of ideals and values might in itself be taken to be
relatively straightforward. If genuinely unimpeded creative acts grant access to all truth, they
thereby grant access to truths of art, life, and politics; knowledge of the Absolute would imply
the knowledge of our ethical lives that Coleridge,Wordsworth, Blake, and others sought. But, of
course, lest the position be taken to authorise any and all beliefs dreamt up, it remains imperative
that genuine and unconstrained creative acts can be distinguished from acts that only appear so
to their possessors and others. ere must, that is to say, be criteria to enable one to identify
instances and non-instances of genuine creativity—and that is something that the romantics
never oﬀered.
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Knowledge about howwe ought to live was perhaps not what the post-Kantians had inmind
when suggesting that creativity can access truth. Nevertheless, the British romantics’ claim has
had enduring inﬂuence, even if it now seems strange when spelt out explicitly, as has been done
here. is is surely because there is something appealing in the claim that we are the authors
of our own values and ideals, which nevertheless remain more than simple fantasies. It was
only in the philosophic climate that post-Kantianism had initiated that this broader romantic
cognitivist position could have been so successfully articulated.
Notes
1e term ‘romantic cognitivism’ is my own, and I use it hesitantly, not wishing to imply any relation to the recent
movement of cognitive literary studies. (I thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this risk.) As we
shall see, the romantics think that acts of creativity can grant knowledge—they can be as such acts of cognition, directed
towards the apprehension of truth, and it is this connection that I mean the term ‘romantic cognitivism’ to capture.
e position could be contrasted to the claim that acts of creativity are at base only expressive, and as such do not result
in cognitive achievement. See, for example, Gibson, who employs a similar usage.
2On the historical transmission of these Kantian and post-Kantian ideas into England, see AshtoneGerman Idea,
Hamilton Coleridge and German philosophy, Micheli “e Early Reception of Kant’s ought in England 1785–1805”,
and Wellek Immanuel Kant in England, 1793–1838.
3In this essay, I will focus primarily on the Romantic use of post-Kantian ideas that had their origin in Kant’s
theoretical philosophy. As such, I will not engage directly with Kant’s aesthetics. See Brodsky for a treatment of the
relation of imagination and truth speciﬁcally in the aesthetics of Kant.
4See Berkley (187–210) for discussion of the distinction and contextually informed interpretation.
5Such is Wordsworth’s description of his state of mind at Cambridge, when his mental life was passive, characterised
by “Read[ing] lazily in lazy books” (Prelude 41; bk. 3: 254). He is, however, ambiguous about the state of his imagi-
nation even in this stage of his life: “Imagination Slept / And yet not utterly” (Prelude 41; bk. 3: 260–1). We should
note, however, to the extent that imagination is genuinely engaged by reading poetry at this stage, it is again linked
to truth. “Yea, our blind Poet, who in his later day, / Stood almost single, uttering odious truth” (Prelude 42; bk. 3:
284–5).
6Blake writes, for instance, “e Eternal Body of Man is e Imagination, that is, God himself, e Divine Body,
Jesus” (Laocoön Plate qtd. in Damon 195). Yet, however strange this doctrine becomes it is clear that Blake retains a
belief in the instrumental truth-tracking value of imagination and, as Robert Ryan notes, he “always sees the imagination
as the conduit of religious truth” (163).
7See Stillinger for an account of how “Keats came to learn that the kind of imagination he pursued was a false lure”
(2).
8We should note that Keats does not draw Coleridge’s distinction between Fancy and Imagination: for him, the
two are identical.
9See J. Wordsworth: “Aside from Byron, all the Romantic poets attempted serious, complex deﬁnitions of imagi-
nation.” (486)
10Of those who occupy fringe territory in the traditional romantic canon, it is most obviously Carlyle, steeped in
German philosophy, who continues in this line. Quoting from Goethe, he describes “Truth, eternal Reason, / Which
from Beauty takes its dress” as “the end of Poetry at all times” (“State of German Literature” 70–1). He writes that the
poet is “[a]n inspired Soul once more vouchsafed us, direct from Nature’s own great ﬁre-heart, to see the Truth, and
speak it, and do it” (Past and Present 107). When Carlyle discusses the Poet as Hero, the cognitive role is returned to
once again. e Poet has “penetrated … into the sacred mystery of the Universe” (Heroes and Hero Worship 95).
11I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.
12When referring to Kant, I quote frome Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant with Academy Edition
references. I follow convention in using the following abbreviations: Critique of Pure Reason (CPR),Critique of Practical
Reason (CPrR), Critique of Judgment (CJ), Lectures on Metaphysics (LM).
13For brevity, in what follows, I conﬁne my discussion to the aspects of ‘intellectual intuition’ that do not involve
Kant’s claim that a being possessed of intellectual intuition would be a being capable of perceiving things-in-themselves,
and the whole of nature as a unity. Gram suggests that these are better seen as diﬀerent doctrines, to which Kant merely
gives the same name. (“Kant uses one designation to cover three very diﬀerent issues” which are “logically independent”
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(288)). I do not wish to take a stance on this issue, but will concentrate on what Gram identiﬁes as the second sense of
the term—“the conception of an intellect that would create its own objects just in knowing them” (292). is sense,
along with the third, seems the most important aspect to understanding romanticism. I do not address Gram’s claim
that the use of intellectual intuition in Kant is signiﬁcantly divergent from that in Fichte and Schelling: for the purposes
here, I assume showing the existence of a general intellectual thread will suﬃce. Gram’s claim, however, has not gone
undisputed. See Estes (165–174).
14See, for instance, LM 29: 800: “if a being had intellectual intuition, as we think of God”. See also LM 29: 954.
15See also Pippin (Idealism as Modernism) for a useful discussion of the connection to the spontaneity of the divine
intellect: “when God’s intuition is said to be ‘spontaneous’, Kant means that it ‘creates’ (a suﬃcient but not necessary
condition of spontaneity) the instances or objects it intuits” (31).
16In what follows, I refer to Fichte’sWissenschaftslehre by way of W followed by academy reference, using Heath and
Leach’s translation in e Science of Knowledge.
17We should note that Fichte claims not to be using the term ‘intellectual intuition’ in Kant’s sense, highlighting
passages in which Kant speaks of intellectual intuition granting access to noumena, an entity that Fichte denies the
existence of. See W 1.172. is seems to be an issue of intellectual loyalty to the founder of the critical philosophy,
however: in the other aspects, Kant and Fichte’s conceptions of intellectual intuition share much. See Beiser (299–301).
18It cannot be reasonably doubted that positing is a creative act. Besides committing to the spontaneity of such
positing, Fichte often utilises the vocabulary of creativity. See, for instance: W 1.174, 1.427, 1.429.
19References to the Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism will be signalled in text by STI followed by page
reference to this edition; references to references to the Idea for a Philosophy of Nature will be signalled in text by IPN
followed by page reference to this edition. In both cases, I make use of Heath’s translation.
20See n.1.
21See Stone for a discussion of how the themes tackled in this paper were extended by Novalis and Schlegel.
22Under the inﬂuence of Coleridge, John Stuart Mill captures the British romantic concern with the discursive
reason well. Writing about Bentham, Hume, and the philosophes, he writes: “[t]o tear away, was indeed all that these
philosophers, for the most part, aimed at: they had no conception that anything else was needful” (131–2). ey saw
“what was not true, not what was” (139).
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